Preparatory Committee for the 2005 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

6 May 2004

Original: English

Third session
New York, 26 April-7 May 2004

Position paper on the final outcome of the third session of the Preparatory Commission

Submitted by the Non-Aligned States and other States parties to the Treaty

1. The NAM recalls that this PrepCom has been mandated and tasked to undertake the following:

- "Consider specific matters of substance relating to the implementation of the Treaty and Decisions 1 and 2, as well as the Resolution on the Middle East adopted in 1995, and the outcomes of subsequent Review Conferences, including developments affecting the operation and purpose of the Treaty". (Final Document of the 2000 NPT Review Conference)
- "At its third and, as appropriate, fourth session, the Preparatory Committee, taking into account the deliberations and results of its previous sessions, should make every effort to produce a consensus report containing recommendations to the Review Conference." (Final Document of the 2000 NPT Review Conference)
- "The States Parties agreed that the procedural arrangements for the Review Conference should be finalised at the last session of the Preparatory Committee." (Final Document of the 2000 NPT Review Conference)
- "The Conference agrees that legally binding security assurances by the five nuclear-weapon States to the non-nuclear-weapons States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime. The Conference calls upon the Preparatory Committee to make recommendations to the 2005 Review Conference on this issue." (Final Document of the 2000 NPT Review Conference)
- "The establishment of such subsidiary bodies would be recommended by the Preparatory Committee for each Review Conference in relation to the specific objectives of the Review Conference." (Final Document of the 2000 NPT Review Conference and Decision 1 on 'Strengthening the Review Process for the Treaty' adopted in 1995)

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

2. The NAM calls for a draft report for the Third Session of the PrepCom that will need to be adopted by consensus and that will contain the recommendations that are required to be made by this PrepCom to the 2005 NPT Review Conference.

3. The NAM calls for a recommendation for the establishment of Subsidiary Bodies to Main Committees I and II, respectively, at the 2005 NPT Review Conference on the issues of nuclear disarmament, the implementation of the Middle East Resolution adopted in 1995, and security assurances, which should be included under the recommendations to be made by the PrepCom.

4. The NAM calls for any Chair's Factual Summary Paper to be considered once the Chair has made it available and has been finalised.

5. The NAM does not support the attachment of the Chair's Factual Summary Reports of the First and Second Sessions of the PrepCom to the Report of the Third Session of the PrepCom. The Third Session of the PrepCom was required to take into account the deliberations and results of its previous Sessions and the elements contained in the Chair's Factual Summary Reports of the First and Second Sessions of the PrepCom should consequently be considered in the preparation of the content of this PrepCom's outcome and, therefore, are not required to be separately attached.

6. The NAM would not support a summarised review of the implementation and operation of the Treaty to be included in the PrepCom Report. Agreement between the States Parties on the implementation and operation of the Treaty requires detailed negotiations and would need to be comprehensive and reflect all aspects of the implementation and operation of the Treaty.

7. The NAM would not support the description of the procedural arrangements for the Review Conference as "recommendations". Such an approach would not fulfil the mandate that has been tasked to this PrepCom, namely that it "should make every effort to produce a consensus report containing recommendations to the Review Conference." The requirement to conclude the procedural arrangements was identified as a separate tasking to the PrepCom.

8. The NAM strongly endorses the Chair's proposal to hold open-ended consultations and underlines the need for such consultations, as this will allow all delegations to participate and be engaged with one another on the issues to be dealt with by the PrepCom.

Preparatory Committee for the 2005 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

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Implementation of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Report submitted by the Republic of Kazakhstan

1. Kazakhstan, a party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons since 1993, considers that the Treaty remains the key instrument for the prevention of vertical and horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons, and the starting point for nuclear disarmament.

The decision by the country's leadership to voluntarily renounce nuclear status was a matter of principle, and Kazakhstan continues to adhere strictly to the principles of non-proliferation. All nuclear weapons have been removed from the country's territory, and all work which could potentially have led to military uses of nuclear energy has ceased. With support from a number of foreign countries, a broad programme to convert the former military research infrastructure has been conducted — this concerns both specialists who were involved in the military programmes of the former Soviet Union, and the infrastructures of testing areas.

2. Kazakhstan attaches great importance to the full implementation of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards and to strengthening the Agency's verification mechanisms.

All nuclear activities in Kazakhstan are under IAEA supervision in accordance with a safeguards agreement. The Agency conducts regular inspections at its nuclear sites in order to verify the quantity of nuclear materials officially declared by the country.

In connection with the signature on 6 February 2004 of an additional protocol to the safeguards agreement with IAEA, Kazakhstan proposes to implement additional measures to strengthen the regime for the verification of nuclear activities.

Currently, 11 programmes are under way in Kazakhstan in the framework of the IAEA technical cooperation programme. The country is also participating in seven IAEA regional projects.

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Under the technical cooperation programme, IAEA is financing the research in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy being conducted by institutions and organizations in Kazakhstan. In just four years, five IAEA research contracts have been fulfilled, each of them worth about $5,000 per annum. Grants are also provided to enable Kazakh nationals to take part in various educational courses, seminars, conferences and symposiums conducted with IAEA participation, and payments are made for the expert services of specialists involved in various aspects of the Agency's work.

The Republic of Kazakhstan has signed the following international agreements:

- The Convention on Nuclear Safety, of June 1994;
- The Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management, of 29 September 1997;

Preparations are being made to sign the following:

- The Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material;
- The Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency;
- The Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident.

3. Comprehensive State control over trade in nuclear materials, equipment, dual-use technologies and arms is an integral part of Kazakhstan's policy in the area of non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

In March 1993, in connection with the beginning of independent exports of nuclear and dual-use items, the Government of Kazakhstan adopted a decision on the export and import of nuclear materials and dual-use materials and technologies, laying the foundation of the country's export-control system.

In 1996, Kazakhstan adopted a law on export controls in relation to arms, materiel and dual-use products, which became the cornerstone of the country's export regulation system. Since November 2000, there has been a national list, renewed periodically, of items subject to export control; this list meets the requirements of international non-proliferation regimes.

International experts consider that Kazakhstan's regulatory basis in the area of export controls complies with international standards. Further evidence of this is the fact that in May 2002, Kazakhstan was accepted into the Nuclear Suppliers Group. As early as 2000, pursuing its consistent policy in the area of non-proliferation, Kazakhstan applied to join the Missile Technology Control Regime, providing all the necessary documentation.

Preparatory Committee for the 2005 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

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Implementation of article VI of the NPT and paragraph 4 (c) of the 1995 decision on principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament

Report submitted by the Czech Republic

1. The goal of this report is to present the steps undertaken by the Czech Republic in the implementation of article VI of the Treaty and 4 (c) of the 1995 Decision on "Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament" in accordance with 13 practical steps of the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference.

2. As a Non-Nuclear Weapon State the Czech Republic strongly believes that the final goal of the NPT is the general and complete disarmament. However, it can only be achieved through a series of balanced, incremental and reinforcing steps. In achieving this goal full and pro-active co-operation of all states is necessary.

3. The Czech Republic has always been adamant supporter of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty and signed it in 1996. Being the first European State that ratified it in 1997 it considers the Treaty as one of the pillars of the non-proliferation regime. Therefore it believes that its early entry into force (EEIF) continue to be a high priority task.

4. The Czech Republic has been actively supporting the work of the CTBTO Preparatory Commission in Vienna in implementing the Treaty's verification mechanism and Conferences pursuant to the article XIV. The Czech Republic also supported the Ministerial Declaration on the EEIF of the CTBT in 2002. It has served as the Chair of the Preparatory Commission.

5. In addition to the above mentioned facts the Czech Republic is hosting on its territory an auxiliary seismic station in Vranov u Brna which is part of the International Monitoring System (IMS). The fully and early operational IMS before entry into force of the Treaty would constitute an important confidence and security–building measure. To achieve this goal will require further efforts from all State Parties to the CTBT.

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6. Any partial or regional test moratoria are welcomed by the Czech Republic and considered as a significant confidence and security-building measures. However, they cannot replace the legally binding commitment represented by the obligations under the CTBT.

7. The Czech Republic as a Non-Nuclear Weapon State and not party to the Conference on Disarmament (CD) is of the view that the goal of nuclear disarmament could be achieved through various international forums and instruments. At the same time it believes that the CD is an integral part of the general disarmament. It is with regret that the CD has not yet been able to start its substantive work and that the membership is not open to all countries which credentials in the field of disarmament have been proven.

8. The Czech Republic as a Non-Nuclear Weapon State considers the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT) as a logical step on the multilateral arms control agenda. It shall be one of the top priorities of the Conference on Disarmament (CD) negotiations. The Czech Republic notes with interest that regardless the deadlock situation in the CD the informal work initiated by the Netherlands on the FMCT issues is carried out in Geneva.

9. Principle of irreversibility has always been supported by the Czech Republic both in multilateral and bilateral arms controls and considered as a very important element for the strengthening of the international stability and security.

10. The Czech Republic as a Non-Nuclear Weapon State welcomes all achievements in nuclear disarmament and both unilateral and bilateral measures oriented to the future reduction of nuclear arsenals as well as new arrangements on the way to the final irreversible elimination of nuclear weapons. In this context the Czech Republic welcomes the entry into force of the Strategic Offensive Treaty (Moscow Treaty) between the United States and the Russian Federation in June 2003 and looks forward to its full implementation.

11. On number of occasions it was pointed out by the Czech Republic that it would be a logical step of the highest significance that all fissile material designated as no longer required for military purposes by each of Nuclear -Weapon States to be placed under the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards or other relevant international verification.

12. The Czech Republic highly appreciated successful completion of the first phase of the Trilateral Initiative for placing excess nuclear materials from the Russian and the US dismantled weapons under the IAEA safeguards.

13. The Czech Republic also welcomes any other unilateral placements of Nuclear-Weapon States' fissile material under the IAEA safeguards and urges the IAEA to continue research and development into the practical aspects of verifying such material declared excess to military use.

14. The general stability and security are directly linked to the nuclear non-proliferation. Therefore the universal implementation of the IAEA comprehensive safeguards including Additional Protocol (AP) as well as application of physical protection objectives and fundamentals is the

main confidence building measures in the nuclear non-proliferation. Naturally, the Czech Republic favours that the 2005 Review Conference will take a decision that the AP is mandatory under Article III of the Treaty. Only with universal adherence to the IAEA comprehensive safeguards and the AP could be possible to achieve much higher level that assures the terrorists would not be able to gain access to nuclear material. At the same time the Czech Republic strongly believes that AP should become a condition of supply for transfer of nuclear and dual-use items.

15. The IAEA's verification activities and its achievements under strengthen safeguards system are highly appreciated by the Czech Republic. However, to assure compliance with nuclear disarmament agreements it is of the view that further development of reliable equipment and procedures is necessary. The Czech Republic therefore joined the IAEA's Safeguards Support Programme in 2003.

16. The IAEA's Action Plan to Combat Nuclear Terrorism has been supported by the Czech Republic since its creation. It contributed 40.000 USD to the IAEA's Security Fund in 2003 and 55.000 USD will be contributed in 2004.

17. The Czech Republic supports the IAEA's efforts to enhance the safety and security of radioactive sources and adherence to the relevant Code of Conduct.

18. The Czech Republic attaches great importance to the efforts aimed at the amending the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM). It welcomed the Austrian initiative aimed at convening a Diplomatic Conference to amend the Convention in line with its article 20. The Czech Republic is among those countries that signed up the letter to the Director General in this regard.

19. The non – proliferation regime can be enhanced by strict observance of the export controls. The Czech Republic as an active participant of the Zangger Committee and the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) has implemented in its national legislation high standard of export controls including catch all principle. During the Czech chairmanship of the NSG (May 2002- May 2003) transparency of the NSG through the outreach dialogue with countries outside of the NSG was further enhanced. The antiterrorist clause was added to the NSG Guidelines. It is the view of the Czech Republic that these guidelines could be used effectively in the fight against the nuclear terrorism worldwide.

20. This report, together with the national statements provided within the NPT PrepCom sessions, constitute the fulfilment of the Czech Republic's obligation under the agreed reporting procedure. The Czech Republic believes that such reports submitted by all States Parties can significantly improve the NPT's review process.

Preparatory Committee for the 2005 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

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The contemporary crisis of compliance

Submitted by the United States

The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) occupies a vital position at the core of the international community's broader efforts to preserve and promote peace and security by preventing the spread of all weapons of mass destruction. While, at its core, the NPT revolves around states' agreement to nonproliferation principles that protect their common security, it also incorporates an important understanding: countries should be entitled to cooperate to obtain the benefits that peaceful nuclear energy and research can bring to mankind, but they may do so only if they comply with the provisions of the Treaty designed to prevent the misuse of such technology and the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

The two components of this understanding, shared benefits and nonproliferation compliance, are inseparable. Problems with compliance, therefore, threaten the security and other benefits of the Treaty that are the reason why more than 180 states have become parties. There has been, however, a serious breakdown of compliance by a few NPT parties with the core nonproliferation undertakings of the Treaty contained in Articles II and III. Because of the connection between Article II compliance and the right of an NPT party under Article IV to peaceful nuclear cooperation, Article IV has also taken center stage in discussions on compliance.

The nonproliferation component of the NPT regime has several elements, of which the IAEA, as an international monitoring mechanism and institution for detecting safeguards noncompliance, is a key part. Each non-nuclear weapon state party to the Treaty is required to conclude a safeguards agreement with the IAEA covering all nuclear material within the territory of the state under its jurisdiction, or carried out under its control anywhere. In the event that inspectors report noncompliance with a state's obligations under its NPT safeguards agreement to the IAEA Director General, the Director General transmits the report to the IAEA Board of Governors. The Board, in turn, *must* report any safeguards noncompliance that it finds to all IAEA members and to the U.N. Security Council and General Assembly. In addition to the provisions for reporting noncompliance,

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the IAEA's Statute also calls for it to report to the Security Council if questions arise regarding the IAEA's activities that are within the competence of the Security Council.

The Security Council has responsibility for determining t'ie existence of threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, or acts of aggression, and for deciding on measures to maintain or restore international peace and security. Accordingly, the Security Council may play a role in remedying both safeguards noncompliance and other non-safeguards related NPT violations. National governments also play a critical role both in deterring and detecting violations, and in taking resolute action -- individually and collectively -- to enforce compliance and hold violators accountable for their actions.

The nonproliferation regime works best when these elements act smoothly together to deter, detect, and remedy noncompliance. International and regional security is seriously jeopardized if violations are not dealt with decisively and effectively. They should not be missed, whitewashed, excused, or simply ignored.

A bedrock principle of international law is the maxim *pacta sunt servanda* (agreements must be respected). This is the core of compliance policy: agreements, the law demands, must be kept. To insist upon anything less would debase the currency of international discourse and make it impossible to realize the contributions that arms control, nonproliferation, and disarmament agreements can make to international peace and security. A world in which countries can ignore their commitments is a world more dangerous for all of us. The pretense of arms control, however, is even more dangerous, for it can provide a false sense of security that constrains only the honest. If an agreement is worth having -- and the United States believes that the NPT is such an agreement -- it is necessarily worth enforcing.

The world today faces a crisis of compliance in the NPT regime. Iran, Libya, Iraq and North Korea, were all able to pursue nuclear weapons programs -- in North Korea's case even actually building nuclear weapons -- in violation of Articles II and III of the NPT while variously pursuing "peaceful" nuclear programs, claiming legitimacy as members in good standing of the NPT system, and in some cases even receiving international assistance. Of these, only Libya has taken clear steps to recommit itself to adherence to the nonproliferation regime and abandoned its pursuit of weapons of mass destruction. Iran and North Korea remain compliance challenges that have yet to be fully addressed.

As serious as are the threats Iran and North Korea pose to international peace and security in and of themselves, they also represent fundamental challenges to the nonproliferation regime *as a whole*. Iran and North Korea are not just country-specific, bilateral, or even multilateral problems: they are problems for the nonproliferation regime itself, and the international community must hold these states accountable for their noncompliance; failure to do so would not be lost upon other would-be violators. Despite Libya's welcome steps to support the nonproliferation regime, there are likely others tempted to confront the international community as has Iran and North Korea. The future credibility of the NPT regime depends upon our collective response to these challenges.

That is why it is so important to focus on the crucially important issue of compliance with the fundamental nonproliferation obligations of the Treaty. The United States believes it vital to ensure that the NPT regime successfully meets these challenges. President Bush has taken important steps in this direction, acting emphatically to prevent and reverse the spread of WMD technology, and advancing groundbreaking new initiatives in bilateral, multilateral, and international fora to strengthen the regime and adapt it to contemporary problems. Taking stronger collective action now to promote NPT compliance will help to ensure that future generations can live in a world made safer by controlling the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

Preparatory Committee for the 2005 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

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Report on measures to promote the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East and the realization of the goals and objectives of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East

Report submitted by Tunisia

In accordance with the provisions of the final document of the sixth Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons held in 2000 (NPT/CONF.2000/28) requesting all States parties, particularly the nuclear-weapons States, the States of the Middle East and other interested States, to report through the United Nations Secretariat to the Chairperson of the Preparatory Committee meetings to be held in advance of the 2005 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons on the steps that they have taken to promote the achievement of such a nuclear-weapons-free zone and the realization of the goals and objectives of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East, the Government of Tunisia has the honour to transmit the following information:

Tunisia has always manifested its commitment to the principles of disarmament in general and nuclear disarmament in particular. It considers that nuclear-weapons-free zones play an important role in strengthening the nuclear non-proliferation regime and bringing about the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. Reflecting that stance:

- Tunisia acceded to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) on 26 February 1970.
- Tunisia signed a comprehensive safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) on 24 February 1989 and ratified it on 12 February 1990. Negotiations concerning the signing of an additional protocol to the agreement are in progress.
- It signed the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty in 1996. The procedures for ratification are in progress.

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- It signed the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty (Pelindaba Treaty) and in that regard welcomes the fact that the Antarctic Treaty and the Treaties of Tlatelolco, Rarotonga and Bangkok, along with the Pelindaba Treaty, are helping to free the Southern Hemisphere and adjacent areas from the presence of nuclear weapons. In that regard, it also welcomes the steps taken towards the conclusion of new treaties creating nuclear-weapons-free zones.

- Tunisia is one of the sponsors of the resolution submitted every year to the General Assembly by Egypt on behalf of the Arab Group of States on the risks of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East.

- Every year in the General Assembly it supports the resolution on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East.

- At the 1999 substantive session of the Disarmament Commission, Tunisia played an active role in the Working Group on the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones, which adopted a report by consensus encouraging, among things, the establishment of such a zone in the Middle East.

In view of the importance of stability in the region of the Middle East for international peace and security, Tunisia remains concerned about the lack of progress in establishing a nuclear-weapons-free zone in the Middle East and in implementing the provisions of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East, which was an integral part of the decision on the indefinite extension of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

Although all other countries in the region, without exception, are parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Israel, the possessor of nuclear weapons, is the only country that refuses to accede to the Treaty and to place all its nuclear facilities unconditionally under full-scope IAEA safeguards. The position taken by Israel is an obstacle to disarmament efforts in general and to the establishment of lasting peace in the region and is reflected in the excessive militarization pursued by Israel, which also possesses other weapons of mass destruction.

In this regard, it is the responsibility of all States parties to the Treaty and especially the nuclear powers to fulfil their commitments to realize the goals and objectives of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East and the provisions of the final document of the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

Preparatory Committee for the 2005 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

11 May 2004
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Report of the Government of Algeria on measures it has taken to promote the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East and to achieve the goals and objectives of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East

1. In compliance with the provisions of the Final Document of the Sixth Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, in 2000, which requested all States Parties, particularly the nuclear-weapon States, the States of the Middle East and other interested States, to report through the United Nations Secretariat to the President of the 2005 Review Conference as well as to the Chairperson of the Preparatory Committee meetings to be held in advance of that Conference, on the steps that they have taken to promote the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East and the achievement of the goals and objectives of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East, the Government of the People's Democratic Republic of Algeria has the honour to report as follows:

2. Algeria considers that the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone is an effective contribution to the strengthening of regional peace and security and helps to strengthen the non-proliferation regime and to achieve the objectives of nuclear disarmament.

3. Given their proximity and the close ties between Africa and the Middle East, Algeria is deeply concerned at the lack of progress towards the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in this highly sensitive region. It therefore believes that practical steps must be taken to implement the provisions of the 1995 resolutions on the Middle East, which was submitted by the three NPT depositary States and adopted by the Fifth Review Conference.

In this regard, Algeria recalls that the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference reaffirms the importance of this resolution and considers that, pending the realization of its goals and objectives, the resolution remains valid.

4. Algeria also endorses the position articulated by the States Parties at the Sixth Review Conference, calling on Israel to accede to the NPT and to submit its nuclear installations to the comprehensive safeguards regime of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in order to achieve the goal of universal adherence to the

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Treaty in the Middle East region and to realize the legitimate aspiration for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone.

5. Algeria has chosen to promote research into the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Accordingly, it has acceded to the NPT and concluded in March 1996 a comprehensive safeguards agreement under which all its nuclear activities are subject to IAEA inspection in accordance with Article II of the Treaty. Algeria also ratified in July 2003 the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT).

6. Algeria's actions have always been aimed at promoting the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones throughout the world. It has subscribed to the Declaration of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) on the Denuclearization of Africa and, on 11 February 1998, it became the third African State to have ratified the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty (Treaty of Pelindaba). In that spirit, Algeria welcomed the creation of similar zones in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco), the South Pacific (Treaty of Rarotonga) and South-East Asia (Treaty of Bangkok), which have considerably reduced the risk of nuclear proliferation and contributed to the strengthening of international peace and security. It also welcomes the efforts being made by the five States of Central Asia to conclude a treaty for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in that region.

7. As a member of the Group of Arab States, Algeria is a co-sponsor of the draft resolution on the risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East, submitted each year to the United Nations General Assembly, and supports the resolution on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East. It also participated actively in the working group on the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones during the substantive session of the Disarmament Commission, held in April 1999.